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Now, despite its apparent popularity, an auctioneer implementing an English auction
with discrete bid levels is faced with two complimentary challenges. Firstly, it must deter-
mine the actual discrete bid levels to be used within the auction. The standard academic
auction literature provides little guidance here since it commonly assumes a continuous
bid interval, where bidders incrementally outbid one another by an inﬁnitesimally small
amount. However, discrete bid levels do have an effect, and have been investigated by
Rothkopf and Harstad [13]. They showed that the revenue of the auction is dependent on
the number and distribution of discrete bid levels implemented and, in general, the use of
discrete bid levels reduces the revenue generated by the auction. Conversely, the discrete
bid levels also act to greatly reduce the number of bids that must be submitted in order
for the price to reach the closing price. This has the effect of increasing the speed of the
auction and, hence, reduces the time and communication costs of both the auctioneer and
bidders. By analysing the manner in which the discrete bid auction could close and then
calculating the expected revenue of the auctioneer in a number of limited cases (which
we detail in section 2), they were able to derive the optimal distribution of bid levels that
would maximise this revenue. Then, in previous work, we extended this result to the gen-
eral case, and we can now determine the optimal bid levels for an auction in which the
environmental parameters are given [4]. Speciﬁcally, these parameters are the number of
bidders participating in the auction and the bidders’ valuation distribution .
Thus, performing this optimal auction design introduces the second of the two chal-
lenges; that of determining, for the particular setting under consideration, the values of
these environmental parameters. Now, in some settings these may be well known. How-
ever, in most cases they will not, and, to this end, in this paper, we tackle the problem of
determining the optimal discrete bid levels when these values must be estimated through
observations of previous auctions. In so doing, we extend the state of the art in three key
ways.
1. We extend previous work by deriving an expression that describes the expected rev-
enue of a discrete bid auction when the number of bidders participating is unknown
but can be described by a probability distribution.
2. We use this expression to calculate the optimal bid levels that maximise the auction-
eers’revenueinthiscase.Wedemonstratethattheoptimaldiscretebidlevelsproduced
by this method are dependent on the distribution of the number of participating bidders
and on the distribution that describes the bidders’ valuations.
3. We show that this same expression allows us to use machine learning, and speciﬁcally
Bayesian inference, in an online algorithm that generates sequentially better estimates
for the parameters that describe the two unknown distributions (i.e. the distribution of
the number of bidders participating in any auction and the distribution of the bidders’
valuation) by observing only the closing price of previous auctions.
The results that we provide may be used in the design of online auctions or may be used
by automated trading agents that are dynamically adopting the role of an auctioneer within
a multi-agent system. In such settings these auction protocols are attractive as they pro-
vide a relatively simple bidding strategy for the agents, yet, unlike second price sealed
bid auctions, do not require the bidders to reveal their full private information to the auc-
tioneer. In this setting, there is clearly a need to fully automate the design of such auction
mechanisms, and the work presented here represents a key step in this direction.